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Abstract
Economic policy coordination in the euro-zone relies heavily on the
self-commitment of the participating countries given the soft nature of the
coordination framework foreseen in the treaty provisions of Economic and
Monetary Union. Presenting a theoretical framework for the analysis of
the impact of the method of informal ministerial discussions within the Eu-
rogroup on the coordination process the paper argues that the creation of
spaces for intergovernmental deliberation are crucial for fostering politi-
cal unity among the finance ministers of the euro-zone countries, the
Commission and the European Central Bank.
I Introduction
In the run-up to the beginning of the final stage of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) national governments felt that closer contacts among the top pol-
icy-makers of the future single currency area were needed to master the new chal-
lenges to economic policy-making. They tried to tackle the apparent contradiction
of the will to move towards closer coordination and the general resistance against
any further transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level in the area of eco-
nomic policy by setting up the Eurogroup – an informal ministerial forum for in-
tensive policy dialogue, which also comprises representatives from the Commis-
sion and European Central Bank (ECB). The paper focuses on the particular dif-
ference the informal working method makes with regard to the dialogue among
ministers. Do they just talk or is the informal setting particularly suited to encour-
age a specific form of dialogue leading to results, which can compensate for the
lack of formal decision-making competences at the supranational level? In con-
trary to formal settings where the results of ministerial negotiations have a prede-
fined legal status, informal ministerial discussions imply that there is nothing but
the dialogue itself, which can ensure the commitment of the involved parties to
commonly agreed positions.
Theoretically the paper builds on debates on communicative action in interna-
tional negotiations and develops a framework for analysis of informal ministerial
circles. It is argued that in the absence of legally binding instruments in the area of
economic policy coordination consensus seeking through deliberation plays a piv-3
otal role in ensuring ministers commitment to the common interest of the euro-
zone. The informal working method of the Eurogroup is particularly suited to
trigger deliberative interaction embedding information exchange and bargaining
about distributional conflicts in a strong normative framework and leading to a
particular form of interaction, which for some might seem to be a contradiction in
itself: deliberative intergovernmentalism.
II The paradox: being close without rendering formal deci-
sion-making competences
While the respective role of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the
European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is very similar
for most of the areas, which can be subsumed under the “classical Community
framework”
1 the institutional arrangements with regard to EMU, justice and home
affairs and the common foreign and security policy follow a different logic. In
these areas “intensive interactions between national policy-makers”
2 are central to
the decision-making process. In other words, the member states want to be close
without rendering formal decision-making competences to the EU level.
3
Being bound together by a single currency implies that national policy deci-
sions become highly interdependent and that common action is a precondition for
the smooth functioning of the euro-zone. While monetary policy is centralized and
conducted by the supranational European Central Bank (ECB), the member states
remain responsible for the conduct of their economic policies. While there is
agreement that monetary union requires coordination in this area in principle the
current set-up was founded upon the idea that however “close coordination of
discretionary economic policies”
4 would neither be necessary nor appropriate for
1 H. Wallace, ‘The Institutional Setting – Five variations on a theme’, in H. Wallace and W.
Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.
2 Ibid.
3 Cf. Article 202, TEC, which specifies the competencies of the Council, explicitly mentions
the ‘coordination of the economic policies of the member states’ as a task, which is distinct from
the Council’s right to take decisions and to confer powers regarding the implementation of its
decisions on the Commission.
4 See S.Korkman, ‘Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU: Should it Go Beyond the SGP?’ in A.
Brunila, M. Buti, D. Franco (eds.), The Stability and Growth Pact – The Architecture of Fiscal
Policy in EMU, (Palgrave, 2001), 287-310 (emphasis added; up).4
EMU. In the conduct of their economic policies member states are obliged to fol-
low certain rules and to regard these policies as “a matter of common concern” –
subject to coordination in the Council.
5 While the Treaty provisions on the avoid-
ance of excessive deficits can be seen as “hard” rules, which include sanctions in
case of non-compliance, compliance with the other central instrument, which
should ensure coherence of the national economic policies – the broad economic
policy guidelines (BEPGs) – is a matter of self-discipline.
6 With the adoption of
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which consists of a European Council reso-
lution and two Council regulations on the surveillance of the budgetary positions
of the member states, the economic situation and the consistency of national poli-
cies with the commonly agreed BEPGs, the Treaty provisions have been further
specified and made operational.
7 Although it can be said that the SGP has helped
to create an environment in which member states face tough scrutiny in case of
non-compliance with common rules and guidelines, EMU only works if its indi-
vidual members commit themselves deliberately to the common interest and are
led by “European thinking”
8 with regard to the conduct of their own national poli-
cies. Finally, as the name suggests the BEPGs’ focus on the more general and
long-term issues of the conduct of the member states’ economic policies. In other
words, it is up to the involved actors to see on a case-by-case basis whether they
deem further coordination efforts necessary or not. Consensus on these issues
among the euro-zone countries is not a foregone conclusion since member states
are characterised by different economic policy traditions and economic and budg-
etary situations. Although the ECB enjoys full independence with regard to the
conduct of monetary policy the interplay between the ECB’s decisions and the
economic policies of the member states is certainly another issue of concern to the
members of the single currency.
In the run-up to the beginning of the final stage of EMU the Luxembourg
European Council in December 1997 tried to address the need for closer coordina-
tion among euro-zone countries with the creation of an informal ministerial forum
5 See Article 99, TEC.
6 The BEPGs have the legal status of a recommendation.
7 See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact,A m s t e r d a m ,1 7
June 1997; Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, 7 July 1997; Council Regulation (EC) No
1467/97, 7 July 1997.
8 Cf. German finance minister Hans Eichel, interview in Die Zeit, No 23, 2002.5
– the Eurogroup.
9 The agreement was that the group would function as a forum for
discussion of issues, which are of concern to the euro-zone countries only. The
role of the ECOFIN Council as the only formal decision-making body was reaf-
firmed.
10 The Eurogroup cannot produce legally binding decisions. The introduc-
tion of the group did not change the assignment of responsibilities in the treaty
provisions on EMU. The Commission and the ECB are officially only “invited” to
participate in the meetings reflecting the intention not to create a “regular” Com-
munity institution and expressing the ministerial – i.e. intergovernmental – nature
of the forum.
11 At the same time – and this constitutes the paradoxical nature of
policy coordination in EMU – it was the explicit purpose of the installation of the
Eurogroup to bring the top policy-makers of the euro-zone closer together than
ever before. This paradox is expressed in the formula ‘coordination among inde-
pendent actors’, which is used in Brussels to characterise the coordination set-up
in the area of economic policy.
12
9 The Eurogroup was initially called Euro-X Council because of the uncertainty regarding the
number of participants in the first wave of countries introducing the euro. It then became known as
the Euro-11 Group and later the Euro-12 Group. It is now common practice to refer to the group
simply as the Eurogroup.
10 See Presidency conclusions of the European Council, Luxembourg 12-12-1997.
11 In fact the Commission participation is crucial for the conduct of discussion. Normally, the
responsible Commissioner for economic and financial affairs starts off the discussion of each
agenda item presenting background information and statistical analysis. However, the working
documents presented by the Commission during the sessions do not have the status of official
Commission documents, which are adopted by the Commission as a collective body. They are
“documents prepared by the Commission Services” transmitted to the EFC.
12 Interviews with EU officials in Brussels.6
III The informal working method of the Eurogroup
“There was a clear need to create something more informal than Ecofin where there are as
many as 100 people between ministers and officials. With the Euro-11 there are only 22 mem-
bers: each minister and one adviser. This means we can have a real exchange of views.”
13
The Eurogroup held its first meeting in June 1998. Meetings are attended by
the finance (or economic) ministers of all EU member states participating in the
single currency. A deputy minister or adviser accompanies each minister. No
other officials are allowed to be part of national delegations. The commissioner
responsible for economic and financial affairs attends together with the director-
general of the Commission’s economic and financial directorate. The ECB is rep-
resented by its president and/or its vice-president. Finally, the president of the
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), the committee’s secretary and the
director-general of the economic and social affairs section of the Council’s Gen-
eral Secretariat participate in the meetings. With around 30 participants in the
room the Eurogroup is the smallest circle operating in Brussels. The agenda of the
group is prepared by the EFC secretariat, the respective presidency of the group
and the EFC’s so-called “Eurogroup working party”. Similar to the ECOFIN
Council the Eurogroup asks the EFC to prepare or further investigate specific is-
sues, which are of particular interest to the group. Unlike at the occasion of regu-
lar Council meetings COREPER is not involved in the preparation of Eurogroup
meetings. The proceedings are exclusively left to the EFC as the responsible ex-
pert committee.
The external appearance of the Eurogroup reflects its informal character. The
conclusions of the discussions are not published in the Official Journal of the EU
nor do formal minutes of the meetings exist. Although the group’s president and
the commissioner for economic and financial affairs usually brief the press after
meetings or at the occasion of the regular ECOFIN press conference no pre-
defined pattern for the communication with the press exists and statements vis-à-
vis the press do not necessarily reflect the content and conduct of the actual dis-
cussions. In contrast to this emphasis of the informal character of the group in the
public arena the group is not that invisible regarding its representation in other
13 D. Strauss-Kahn, former French economic and finance minister, interview in Financial
Times, 12-2-1999.7
institutions. The Eurogroup’s president – who is not always the president of the
ECOFIN Council – attends the meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council and
represents the euro-zone countries at G7 and IMF meetings.
The Eurogroup presents itself as a solution to a particular common action
problem. With the introduction of the single currency the interdependencies of
economic policy-making in the different euro-zone countries make it less likely
that independent policy decisions are efficient.
14 Hence the importance of the
institutional framework of the Eurogroup is related to its ability to help to
overcome such a situation. Following cooperation theory the solution of
cooperation dilemmas depends on an institution’s ability to influence the
behaviour of actors in a way that the orientation towards the common interest
prevails over the narrow concentration on the individual interest.
15 Consequently,
the impact informality can make has to be assessed according to these criteria.
This paper argues that the key to the understanding of the Eurogroup’s infor-
mal working method is the distinction between three modes of communication.
The paper differentiates between deliberative discussions, information exchange
and informal bargaining as three alternative forms of communication ministers in
the Eurogroup make use of. While in practice the overall discussion during an
individual session will comprise all three dimensions the analytical distinction
presented here allows the identification of particular elements of the discussion
process, which enables us in turn to assess more precisely the Eurogroup’s ability
to fulfil its institutional task.
IV Disaggregating informality: distinguishing deliberation, in-
formation exchange and informal bargaining
The review of the literature on informal negotiations in international relations
shows that all three modes are associated with informal settings like the one of the
14 See S. Collignon, ‘Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: Institutional and Political Re-
quirements’, paper presented at the Center for European Studies (CES) Harvard University and
L’Institut d’Etudes Européennes de l’Université de Montréal et de l’Université McGill, revised
version, May 2001.
15 Cf. T. Gehring, ‘Der Beitrag von Institutionen zur Förderung der internationalen
Zusammenarbeit – Lehren aus der institutionellen Struktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’,
(1994) 1 Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB), 211-242.8
Eurogroup. However, there are two main theoretical problems with regard to the
applicability of the existing literature
16: Firstly, there is no coherence with regard
to the relative importance of the three modes of communication, their relation or
even their ability to occur simultaneously in the same institutional setting. Theo-
retical divisions over ontology regarding the actor’s motivations prevented a plau-
sible synthesis so far. Secondly, it is important to relate the three modes of com-
munication to the particular institutional setting of the Eurogroup and the content
of discussions to avoid merely philosophical debates on the supremacy of a par-
ticular mode of communication.
Building on a particularly fruitful debate in the German journal of interna-
tional relations – the Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) –o nc o m -
municative interaction in international negotiations between Habermasian con-
structivists and advocates of game theoretical models of communicative action
this paper tries to transcend the general constructivst-rationalist divide over ontol-
ogy regarding the motivation of actors in international negotiations
17 by demon-
strating how the three modes of communication occur simultaneously in the in-
formal environment of the Eurogroup. Arguing and deliberation are about truth
seeking. Here the paper follows Habermasian constructivists.
18 This implies that
actors have to prepared in principle to retreat from whatever their initial strategic
motivation was if the discourse ‘forces’ them to do so. Arguing matters because it
16 Cf. O. Elgström and M. Smith, ‘Introduction: Negotiation and policy-making in the Euro-
pean Union – process, system and order’, (2000) 7 JEPP, Special Issue: Negotiation and Policy-
Making in the European Union – Processes, System and Order, 673-683; J. Lewis, ‘The Methods
of Community in EU Decision-Making and Administrative Rivalry in the Council’s Infrastruc-
ture’, (2000) 7 JEPP, 261-289; J.E. Lodge and F.R. Pfetsch, ‘Negotiating in the European Union:
Introduction’, (1998) 3 International Negotiation – A Journal of Theory and Practice, Special
Issue: Negotiating in the European Union, 289-292.
17 On the constructivist-rationalist divide in the literature on European integration cf. M. Pol-
lack, ‘International Relations Theory and European Integration, (2001) 39 JCMS, 221-244; T.
Risse and A. Wiener, ‘‘Something rotten’ and the social construction of social constructivism: a
comment on comments’, (1999) 6 JEPP, 775-782.
18 See H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that – Reflections on the Relationship of Com-
municative Action and Rationalist Theory in Analysing International Negotiations, paper prepared
for the 4
th Pan-European IR Conference, University of Kent, 8-10 September 2001; and ‘Spielen
hilft nicht immer – Die Grenzen des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes und der Platz der Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns in der Analyse internationaler Beziehungen, (1995) 1 ZIB, 371-391; T.
Risse, ’”Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, 54 IO, 1-39.9
refers to a particular set of shared values or more generally to the democratic idea
of the deliberative principle that every decision, which affects others, should be
justified by “arguments committed to values of rationality and impartiality”
19.A d -
ditionally, as the paper shows for the case of economic policy – discourse about
causal beliefs, which inform policy decisions belongs to this mode of communica-
tion.
Also rationalists have focused on the question of how communicative interac-
tion can affect the preferences and interests of actors involved in the negotiation
process – although approaching arguing and persuasion from a different angle.
Reflecting the rationalist ontology they understand arguing and deliberation as
processes, which comprise essentially the common definition of the situation and
the common definition of regulations in social life.
20 Actors try to persuade their
counterparts that the latter ones have ignored certain consequences of their in-
tended action or are unclear about the interests of the other parties involved in the
process. While such approaches can demonstrate that the rationalist agenda goes
beyond the analysis of ‘hard bargaining’ situations the notion of arguing used in
these concepts does not transcendent the logic of exogenously given preferences
in the sense that it is still assumed that these preferences are not scrutinised in
terms of truth seeking.
It is argued here that the refered rationalist concept of deliberation is a mode of
communication, which should be better called information exchange. Actors do
not change their basic motivations with regard to the interaction process but they
try to realise or maximise their own interests by exchanging information with
other parties. Exchanging information on the own and the other parties’ prefer-
ences can be beneficial for all actors involved because a precise knowledge about
the strategies and intentions of the others enhances the own ability to adapt to the
respective context. Indeed, it is quite often part of the negotiation process to clar-
ify and readjust positions on the basis of new information.
19 See M. Zürn, ‘Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other Interna-
tional Institutions, 6 European Journal of International Relations (EJIR), 183-221.
20 See O. Keck, ‘Zur sozialen Konstruktion des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes, (1997) 4 ZIB,1 3 9 -
151; and ‘Rationales kommunikatives Handeln in den internationalen Beziehungen – Ist eine
Verbindung von Rational-Choice-Theorie und Habermas’ Theorie des kommunkativen Handelns
möglich?’, (1995) 2 ZIB, 5-48.10
Finally, in the (‘hard’) bargaining mode negotiators are not interested in talk-
ing to each other in the sense of persuading their counterparts that the preferences
of the latter ones are wrong or inadequte. The analytical focus is only on the stra-
tegic interaction of the involved parties. In practice, negotiators switch from one
mode to the other. We can observe all three within the context of the Eurogroup.
V Relating the three modes of communication to the setting
and content of the discussions
If we relate the three modes of communication to the particular institutional
framework of the Eurogroup (cf. Table I) we find that the informal setting of the
Eurogroup triggers all three processes in a particular way, which cannot be found
in the regular Council structure of the EU or in international negotiations in gen-
eral.
Table I
deliberation information exchange informal bargaining
setting confidentiality, restricted number of participants, ministerial-level, no formal deci-
sion-making body, exclusive focus on economic policy matters, flexible agenda,
dense normative environment, collegial atmosphere
content economic policy ideas
common challenge
(managing the euro-
zone)
European social model
(moral dimension)
coordination is based on the
precise knowledge of the
other actors’ strategies and
preferences
economic policy co-
ordination in the euro-zone
implies distributive conflicts
irreconcilable ideological
differences
(failure of the two other
modes of communication to
reconcile national interest
and common interest)
The environment for negotiations the Eurogroup’s informal working method
creates is distinct in many ways. The confidentiality of the meetings ensures that
participants are very frank with each other. Sessions take place behind closed
doors and press conferences are convened only sporadically. Policy-makers can
communicate without facing direct scrutiny by the public in general or financial
markets in particular. It is easier for them to voice outright criticism as well as to
admit shortcomings or uncertainty. In such a context deliberative discussions are11
much more likely to occur than within the official framework of the ECOFIN ses-
sions. With regard to information exchange confidentiality ensures that also sensi-
tive information can be communicated and the group of recipients can be con-
trolled. Ministers can think aloud about developments, which could threaten their
budgets. Finally, confidentiality means that informal bargaining is more likely to
focus on problem-solving rather than hard-bargaining because ministers do not
have the opportunity to present themselves as defenders of national interests in
public.
The restricted number of people taking part in the meetings complements the
element of confidentiality. Moreover, the individuals at the table can have real
conversations, in which they can exchange views and not merely read prepared
statements. The ministerial rank of participants reduces principal-agent friction,
which can be found in expert groups or within diplomatic circles, which are so far
the bodies studied with regard to informality and deliberative discussions.
21 Unlike
diplomats or experts finance ministers enjoy considerable political authority to
make decisions. This makes it more likely that they are prepared to review their
positions.
As outlined above the Eurogroup is not an official decision-making body. This
allows for step-by-step discussions in which positions can evolve over time. Ar-
gumentative processes appear less threatening because the discussion of a differ-
ent position does not necessarily imply the irrevocable commitment to adapt this
position. Similarly, information exchange is less risky because providing informa-
tion about the own preferences does not inevitably involve a binding agreement to
act in a particular way if certain conditions are met. Finally, bargaining situations
are informal in the sense that participants can test different positions and explore
possible compromises without the risk of being locked in by institutional proce-
dures.
The concentration of the Eurogroup on the economic and budgetary situation
avoids the problem of overload, which is characteristic of the tight schedule of
ECOFIN sessions. Ministers are less constrained by the time factor. Moreover, the
21 See on epistemic communities P. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic communities and interna-
tional policy co-ordination’, (1992) 46 International Organization (IO), 1-35. For the application
of this concept to the field of EMU see A. Verdun, ‘The role of the Delors Committee in the crea-
tion of EMU: an epistemic community?’, (1999) 62 Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP),
308-328.12
agenda is flexible enough to extend debates if necessary or react on current af-
fairs. Since time is an important precondition for deliberative processes we should
expect that the Eurogroup setting is a positive environment for arguing. The clear
focus of the agenda makes the exchange of information more effective and con-
crete. Finally, the focus on a particular policy area and the time factor support the
informal character of bargaining situations outlined in the previous paragraph.
Another important feature of the Eurogroup’s informal setting is the dense
normative environment and the collegial atmosphere of the meetings. This point is
particularly interesting with regard to the assumption of a “common lifeworld”
22
made by Habermasian constructivists. One of the preconditions for arguing and
deliberation is according to these approaches a shared normative environment to
which negotiators can refer. It can even be said that the “common lifeworld” is the
gateway to arguing and deliberation or the point of reference, which makes nego-
tiators ‘switch heads’ and rethink their strategic motivations.
With regard to the particular setting of the Eurogroup there is a wide range of
shared norms and practices derived from economic and monetary policy coordina-
tion in the past and the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty. Especially the SGP
and the economic ideology behind it act as key point of reference. Usually, fi-
nance ministers are among the longest serving members of cabinets and know
each other for quite some time. Additionally, we know from sociological institu-
tionalists that other modes of communicative behaviour are also constrained by
the normative environment of EU institutions like the Eurogroup.
23
Following this analysis information exchange in itself is also an expression of
shared norms about the practice of coordination and appropriate behaviour rather
than the reflex of a situation where immediate mutual benefits are the driving
force behind the actors’ behaviour. Similarly, informal bargaining is constrained
by the normative framework of the group. Not all options are open to negotiators
since some of them would be perceived as inappropriate. This is one of the main
reasons why the ‘hard-bargaining image’ of intergovernmental bodies in the EU
does not reflect the reality of these forums.
22 Risse ‘Let’s Argue!’, note 18 supra.
23 Cf. Lewis ‘The Methods of Community’, note 16 supra and ‘Is the “Hard Bargaining” Im-
age of the Council misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the local elec-
tions directive, (1998) 36 JCMS, 479-504.13
While the previous paragraphs focused on how the peculiar informal environ-
ment of the Eurogroup triggers and shapes deliberation, information exchange
and informal bargaining the following section relates the different modes of
communication to the particular content of the Eurogroup’s agenda. This step en-
ables us to derive concrete assumptions on the particular role of each mode.
At first glance, it might seem that the discussion of economic policy matters is
merely a technical exercise, which could be modelled according to the rationalist
concept of deliberative interaction, which is called information exchange in this
paper. This would imply that the preferences of actors could be directly derived
from the structural conditions. However, decision-making in the realm of eco-
nomic policy is determined by constraint as well as by creation.
24 Substantial dis-
cussions on economic policy decisions go beyond the clarification of empirical
facts and the countering of misunderstandings. Economic ideas are beliefs about
causal relations in macroeconomics. They are permanently open to challenge by
competing beliefs and ideas.
25
Additionally, discussions on economic policy refer to a normative dimension
since they have political implications. In particular the reference to the ‘European
social model’ as a normative framework comes to mind. The definition of the
adequate relation between the state and the market is in the centre of discourse.
Consequently, the review of national macroeconomic strategies and the common
assessment of the economic situation in the euro-zone, which are the core ele-
ments of the Eurogroup’s agenda, lead inevitably into discussions with a strong
deliberative element.
Switching to the mode of deliberative discussions happens not by coincidence.
The content of discussions provokes the use of this particular mode of communi-
cation and is not an accidental choice of benign negotiators. On the contrary, the
deliberative element of the discussions is of particular importance for the compo-
sition of the mix of all three modes of discussion that we find within the informal
setting of the Eurogroup. Economic ideas structure the way policy-makers think
24 See P. Hall, ‘The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations’( P r i n c e -
ton University Press 1989).
25 See K. McNamara, ‘The Currency of Ideas – Monetary Politics in the European Union’,
(Cornell University Press, 1998) Cf. on how such processes work in the realm of EMU M. Mar-
cussen, ‘Ideas and Elites – The Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union’, (Aalborg
University Press, 2000).14
and how they choose their strategies. Their readiness to engage in information
exchange or informal bargaining relates back to what they think about causal rela-
tions within the economy.
While the nature of economic ideas explains that discussions on these issues
inevitably lead to arguing and finally turn into discourse on normative issues the
particular task of the Eurogroup to coordinate economic policies among the coun-
tries of the euro-zone gives further indications with regard to the role of arguing
and deliberation in this context. The euro-zone countries compete and cooperate at
the same time. At first glance, the competitive element in the relationship might
seem contrary to and unconnected with the deliberative mode of communication
used in the discussions. However, competition among the euro-zone countries is
not only about distributional conflicts. It is essentially about political leadership
with regard to the orientation and the agenda of the coordination process. The
process of gaining the support of the others touches on the ideological affinities
among the involved actors and is not simply a matter of power politics. Trying to
gain the support of the others and convincing them that the pursued strategy is
appropriate in ideological terms are two sides of the same coin. Only where these
controversies cannot be solved or where distributional confrontations are irrecon-
cilable we should expect a switch to informal bargaining.
Finally, the reference to the particular content of the Eurogroup’s discussions
can provide us with indications on the role of information exchange. Firstly, in-
formation exchange is not an end in itself. It should serve to overcome common
action problems by enabling all involved actors to take the strategies and prefer-
ences of their respective partners into account when dealing with economic policy
within the national context. In addition to the interdependencies among the eco-
nomic policies of the euro-zone countries the relation between the authority in the
realm of monetary policy – the ECB – and the national economic policies is of
importance for the coordination efforts of the Eurogroup. While the overall task of
the Eurogroup clearly requires information exchange among the participants, the
degree and content of the information exchanged within this framework depends
on the concrete orientation of the coordination process, which – as demonstrated
above – refers to the deliberative element of Eurogroup discussions.15
VI The contribution of informality: deliberative intergovern-
mentalism
The Eurogroup generates informal resources, which guide policy-makers in
the absence of formal provisions or form the basis for formal resources such as
treaty provisions, directives, recommendations at the EU level or cabinet deci-
sions and laws in the national context.
26 The Eurogroup can only function through
fostering a consensus among the ministers, which finds its expression elsewhere –
be it that euro-zone countries act as a united group in ECOFIN and are able to
push through their own agenda or in the domestic arena where finance ministers
implement and promote the common positions of the group. In this context delib-
erative discussions play a pivotal role. Consensus achieved through deliberation
implies that actors share a common understanding or a common vision – be it
called a “culture of coordination” or a “single economic philosophy”
27. In the ab-
sence of legally binding coordination instruments this is the only way to ensure
that policy-makers stick to their commitments made within the informal context
of the Eurogroup and only in this way the intensification of the dialogue will
translate into more coherent national policies and a more efficient interplay be-
tween monetary and economic policy in the euro-zone. Information exchange and
informal bargaining are as important for the Eurogroup’s central role in the coor-
dination process as the deliberative element of the discussions as these modes are
integral parts of any form of policy coordination. However, the significance of the
informal resources generated through these two modes of communication is de-
pendent on how they fit into the wider framework of coordination and are per-
ceived as appropriate. The particular contribution of the Eurogroup’s informal
working method is to embed information exchange and informal bargaining in a
normative and ideological framework.
Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer have demonstrated for the area of regula-
tory policies how the comitology system in the EU triggers deliberative processes,
which are constitutive in the formation of European law. By nature European law
26 See on the concept of informal resources A. Wiener, ‘The embedded acquis communautaire
– transmission belt and prism of new governance’, (1998) EUI Working Paper RSC No. 98/35.
27 See P. Jacquet and J. Pisani-Ferry, ‘Economic policy co-ordination in the euro-zone: What
has been achieved? What should be done?’, (Centre for European Reform, London 2001); and L.
Fabius, ‘France’s Mission in Europe’, (2000) Financial Times, 24-7-2000.16
emerges as a product of a conflict of laws. Its supremacy is only recognized as
legitimate because it “has repeatedly managed to civilise national idiosyncrasies
on normatively good grounds”
28. Joerges and Neyer have stressed that “legal prin-
ciples and rules civilising the decision-making process and providing an institu-
tional context for practical reasoning”
29 are therefore crucial. They have called this
particular contribution of the committee system “deliberative supranationalism”
30.
Building on these insights the working method of the Eurogroup should be under-
stood as a form of deliberative intergovernmentalism. While the rationale behind
consensus seeking in the area of economic policy coordination is essentially the
same, the setting in which the consensus seeking process takes place is distinct
from the comitology environment. Discussions among ministers are explicitly
political and the legal proceduralisation of consensus seeking as well as the in-
volvement of independent experts and technocrats are missing. The informal
process has to create its own rules and procedures concerning the preparation of
the sessions, the role of the presidency, the communication with the press or even
the place where the group meets. Because these rules and procedures are fragile
they can be subject to change. Their stability depends on the self-discipline of the
involved actors.
The contribution of informal ministerial circles like the Eurogroup has impor-
tant implications for the wider debate on the future shape of the EU. In his recent
assessment of the Commission’s “White Paper on Governance” Fritz Scharpf has
highlighted the problem that currently the supranationalisation of decision-making
competences in order to solve common action problems is constrained by the lack
of a “strong European collective identity”.
31 Moreover, without the consent of
national governments the EU has no political authority in its own right since the
violation of key national interests would only lead to the obstruction of decisions
made at the European level. Consequently, consensual solutions at the intergov-
ernmental level are a precondition for the functioning of the EU. Informal minis-
terial circles as the Eurogroup are therefore particularly important for policy areas
28 See C. Joerges, (2002) 8 European Law Journal (ELJ), 133-151.
29 C. Joerges and J. Neyer, ‘From intergovernmental bargaining to deliberative political proc-
esses: The constitutionalisation of Comitology’, (1997) 3 ELJ, 273-299.
30 Ibid.
31 See F. Scharpf, ‘European Governance: Common Concern vs. The Challenge of Diversity,
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in which – as in the case of EMU – the coordination of national policies is re-
quired but a further transfer of formal decision-making competences to the supra-
national not feasible. But the increased use of the Eurogroup’s informal working
method also in other areas could back up existing formal procedures. Finally, the
practice of informal coordination can facilitate the development of future institu-
tional solutions, which comprise new supranational authority and more elements
of hard-coordination. The common standards for the assessment of economic and
political situations and the informal rules and procedures for the conduct of the
coordination process can be seen as evolving norms of constitutionalism.
VII Conclusions
The paper has demonstrated how the set-up of the Eurogroup as an informal
ministerial forum is linked to the ambiguous approach to economic policy coordi-
nation, which is inherent to the current institutional set-up of EMU. Given the
institutional constrain, which EMU has in common with other policy areas – that
member states categorically rule out the further transfer of key national compe-
tences to the supranational level at least in the medium term – coordination relies
on non-binding or ‘soft’ instruments. Informal ministerial circles like the Euro-
group can be a way out of the institutional dilemmas associated with such a situa-
tion. The paper presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of the ability of
informal ministerial circles to compensate for the lack of formal decision-making
competences through an intensification of contacts among ministers. These circles
provide a framework for deliberative intergovernmentalism triggering the devel-
opment of shared normative and ideological standards for the orientation and con-
duct of the coordination process – enabling ministers to conclude de facto deci-
sions.
However, informal intergovernmental institutional arrangements cannot be a
permanent solution to the current institutional dilemmas within the EU. The most
likely scenario with regard to the euro-zone is the further strengthening of the Eu-
rogroup and a modest formalisation of the body including the introduction of new
decision-making competences in connection with enlargement. The challenge is to18
preserve the informal within the formal – as policy-makers admit.
32 This concern
reflects the importance of an intellectual consensus among the top policy-makers
as a precondition for the functioning of coordination within the current set-up as
well as for the effectiveness of a revised legal framework, which will rely – no
matter how precise its provisions will be – on the consent of national govern-
ments.
32 Cf. German deputy finance minister Kaio Koch-Weser, “Der Euro – wie geht es weiter mit
der europäischen Integration“, presentation and discussion, Forum Constitutionis Europae,
Humboldt Universität, Berlin, 15 January 2002.